Shortly after 1647 on 25 February 2025, Discovery 2 left Deep Creek carrying 11 passengers. The operator's website had billed the experience as canyon jet boating at its best, promising highly skilled drivers manoeuvring the boat just inches from sheer canyon walls, speeds in excess of 80 kilometres per hour, and a series of 360-degree spins. By 1701, on the return leg from Skippers Bridge, the engine had cut out. At approximately 1702, the vessel struck the canyon wall.
The Transport Accident Investigation Commission's final report, published in April 2026 under reference MO-2025-202, traces that engine failure to a single degraded wire inside the engine's wiring harness. A lead connecting the pedal position sensor had been gradually chafing against a rough casting edge on the engine. The protective sheathing wore away over time until, on that return leg, the lead shorted out, killing the 5-volt reference signal shared across the engine's critical sensors. The motor stopped.
Arriving at that conclusion demanded months of careful investigation. When the engine cut out, the diagnostic system registered no specific fault code, and initial testing and tracing carried out by the operator's technicians, with Commission investigators observing, neither identified nor replicated the fault. Further in situ inspection followed in March 2025, conducted by Commission investigators and an independent expert working alongside the operator. The wiring harness was then removed for closer examination, and forensic analysis under laboratory conditions identified chafing damage to the wire protection on the pedal position sensor lead. KEM Equipment Incorporated confirmed to investigators that arcing on that lead would probably cause the engine to cut out.
On 21 August 2025, the harness was refitted to Discovery 2 and tests were carried out. Once reinstalled, it naturally came to rest against the area of the suspected short circuit, at what appeared to be that rough casting edge on the engine. When the wire was earthed at idle the engine stalled, and when earthed again at 4,000 revolutions per minute it stalled a second time. On that evidence, the Commission found it virtually certain that chafing against the casting edge had caused the shutdown.
The engine fitted to Discovery 2 had been manufactured prior to 2018. KEM advised the Commission that on post-2018 engines the wiring harness was routed differently, because the newer design included relocation of the engine fuse/relay box, and that additional sheathing of the wires had been introduced to ensure adequate protection of the wiring harness.
With the mechanical cause established, the Commission examined what that failure set in motion on the water. When the engine died, Discovery 2 had no propulsion and no thrust to provide steering control. The driver reset the ignition immediately, but the engine would not start. Travelling at an estimated 60 to 65 kilometres per hour at the moment of failure, the vessel continued across the river and struck the canyon wall at an estimated 30 to 35 kilometres per hour. As a single-engine jet boat, Discovery 2 carried no back-up propulsion, and without power the driver had no means to steer. Once control was lost, there was little opportunity for recovery.
The Commission noted it had previously investigated jet boating accidents resulting from a single point of failure in a critical control system, and the sequence here followed a familiar pattern. In 2019, Discovery 2 had struck the same canyon wall after the driver lost control due to failure of the steering nozzle attachment, three of the four stud-bolts securing the steering nozzle to the jet unit having cracked, leaving both steering and propulsion ineffective. In 2021, a commercial jet boat on the same river lost propulsion and steering after a fuse within the engine control system failed, causing the engine to stop. In both earlier cases, a single point of failure in a critical jet boat control system had produced total loss of control.
Among the report's most significant findings are those concerning the passengers rather than the machinery.
Those who boarded Discovery 2 that afternoon had not all arrived with the same expectations. Some had anticipated a thrill-type experience; others had expected something closer to a scenic tour of Skippers Canyon. The pre-departure briefing and the first few minutes of the trip made clear to everyone on board that this was a thrill-type ride. Passengers described the thrill components as the spins and the boat approaching bends and rocky outcrops at high speed before swerving away at the last minute. That repeated pattern shaped how every person on board interpreted events on the return leg.
Because high-speed, close-call manoeuvres had become the established norm during the trip, passengers' capacity to recognise a genuinely dangerous situation when one arose was reduced. One passenger noted that they heard the driver shout "brace" but still could not process that an accident was actually unfolding, believing it to be part of the ride.
That confusion was compounded by a complete absence of instruction on what bracing actually meant in a jet boat emergency. Passengers had not been informed of what an appropriate brace position was, and were therefore uncertain how to respond when the call came. The Commission found it likely that some passengers suffered worse injuries as a result of that uncertainty.
The report also highlights an unintended consequence around the operator's approach to liability waivers. Skippers Canyon Jet Limited had made a deliberate decision not to use them, on the basis that it considered it had a responsibility to look after customers affected by an accident while participating in its activities. TAIC found this had an unforeseen effect: some passengers interpreted the absence of waivers as an indication that the activity carried relatively low risk.
The regulatory framework governing passenger protection also came under scrutiny. Maritime Rules Part 82 requires that hard surfaces on commercial jet boats be padded where practicable and that seating for thrill-type trips be adequately upholstered. The Commission found that the padding requirements prescribed in the Maritime Rules did not include enough detail to form a measurable standard for passenger protection. When TAIC asked Maritime NZ what "adequate" meant in practice with respect to jet boat seating upholstery, Maritime NZ confirmed it had no specific guidance on the point. Annual inspections of Discovery 2 had found the padding met the requirements of the rules.
TAIC has recommended that the Director of Maritime New Zealand work with New Zealand commercial jet boating stakeholders to review and improve the requirements prescribed to commercial jet boat operators, to ensure that safety measures on board are adequate to protect passengers from injury. Maritime NZ has indicated it will engage with industry stakeholders through its harm prevention programme of work to determine the scale of the issue and consider what type of response, whether rule changes, practice or guidance, would best fit the needs of the recommendation.
Since the accident, Skippers Canyon Jet Limited has introduced a risk disclosure as part of its booking and ticketing process, posted a risk disclosure sign at the jetty, and added new procedures to its safe operational plan covering safety equipment, emergency procedures, and the actions passengers should take in a loss-of-power or sudden-impact scenario. In the Commission's view, these safety actions have addressed the safety issue identified.
